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This paper proposes to assess the usefulness of central banks forward guidance since the
start of the global economic crisis. Using a novel approach, the Wordscores methodology,
we reveal that since 2009, central banks do provide a temporal guidance of their accom-
modative policy that can be relied on and expected. Central banks communication thus
gives important insights to financial markets about the persistence of their unconventional
measures and in particular about the occurrence of an exit strategy.
Keywords: central bank communication, monetary policy, forward guidance.
JEL classification: E52, E58
∗Corresponding author: EQUIPPE - Universite´s de Lille, Cite´ Scientifique, Faculte´ d’Economie et de Sci-




Through forward guidance, central banks try to influence expectations of financial markets by
communicating about their future policy, as a consequence, central bank watchers, financial me-
dia and market participants pay considerable attention to central bankers’ statements. Forward
guidance has thus become an important tool for central banks, more and more described as the
art of managing expectations, since it can enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions
and helps achieve central bank’s macroeconomic objectives. Most of the empirical studies that
dealt with the predictability of central banks’ statements refer to central banks from developed
economies, such as the ECB, or the Fed. There is a broad consensus that these central banks’
communication policy contains forward guidance and move financial markets in the intended
direction (Musard-Gies, 2006; Willhemsen and Zaghini, 2011; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009).
Carlson et al. (2006) find that the communication framework built by the FOMC improved the
public’s ability to predict interest rate decision. Rosa (2009) shows that the tone of central bank
statements is an important explanatory variable of future changes in the ECB main refinancing
rate, while Gerlach-Kristen (2004) shows that the voting record of the Bank of England Mone-
tary Policy Committee helps predict future policy rate changes.
However, the recent economic crisis has brought further challenges for these central banks in
light of the uncertainties and the lack of confidence in financial markets, making their forward
guidance more crucial than ever for the success of their monetary policy. Following this line of
thought, Campbell et al. (2012) introduce a new term to define the practice of forward guid-
ance since the start of the global economic crisis. They describe it as being “Odyssean forward
guidance”, which is the central bank’s commitment to deviate from the established policy rule
at the point in the future when the policy rate is normally expected to rise above zero. The
commitment is to keep the interest rate at zero longer than the policy rule would suggest. The
reason central banks use “Odyssean forward guidance” is because they have lost the ability to
ease policy through the normal channel when the interest rate is constrained at its Zero Lower
Bound (ZLB). The objective of forward guidance at the ZLB is thus to reduce uncertainty,
thereby lowering interest rate volatility and through this channel possibly also risk premia (Fi-
lardo and Hofmann, 2013). Several papers argue that such forward guidance can raise output
in that situation by lowering the expected future policy rate (Campbell et al., 2012; Eggertsson
and Woodford, 2003; Krugman, 1998; Levin et al., 2010; Nakov, 2008; Walsh, 2009; Werning,
2011; Woodford, 2012). Garvin et al. (2013) provide a theoretical modeling of the stimulative
effect of central bank forward guidance when the nominal interest rate is stuck at its ZLB. They
show that it lowers the expected nominal interest rate and increases current consumption.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet empirically assessed the accommodative
stance of central banks’ forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis through
the central banks own discourses. In this paper, we do this for four central banks: the European
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. Relying on
their official policy statements, this paper proposes to fill the gap of the literature by using the
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Wordscores approach introduced in section 2. In section 3, we outline the results. The last
section concludes.
2 The Wordscores approach
2.1 The methodology
Given that forward guidance effectiveness also requires that it is clearly communicated to the
public, we use the Wordscores methodology to assess the content of central banks’ forward
guidance since the onset of the global economic crisis. Introduced by Laver et al. (2003),
this technique, using computerized content analysis, compares the patterns of words used in a
set of “reference texts” with known policy positions, with words contained in “virgin texts”, to
estimate their respective policy positions. Words are then treated as data, rather than something
to be “interpreted” by agents (Krippendorff, 2004), based on the assumption that the relative
frequencies of the use of specific words provide information on monetary decisions. However,
the meaning of a specific word often depends on the context in which it is used. For instance,
while the word “growth” appears to be a positive signal, the phrase “slow growth” does not.
Therefore, we rely on two-word combinations of a noun and an adjective in this analysis, such
as “lower inflation” or “higher unemployment”. This approach differs notably from previous
methods as it does not need to use predefined coding dictionaries as Bligh and Hess (2010), nor
subjective judgments by human coders as in Bulir et al. (2010). The reliability of this approach
is enhanced since the human factor is removed from the coding process. Wordscores can be
implemented using a command line version for Stata1.
This technique requires estimates of the positions of the “references texts”, for example, using
a dimension tightening/easing. Wordscores then estimates the score of a two-word combination,
based on its relative frequency in “reference texts” followed by a tightening/easing monetary
policy. These combinations can be thought of as signals that will serve as the basis for estimating
policy stances of the “virgin texts”.







Probabilityw,r × V aluer (1)
where w denotes a two-word combination in “reference text”, r denotes “reference text”, and
V aluer denotes the assigned value of the “reference text”.
For instance, assume that the two-word combination “high vigilance” appears 10 times in a
“reference text” followed by a tightening policy2 and 2 times in a “reference text” followed by
1For more details on the implementation of the method, see http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/wordscores/.
2denoted with a value of (+1)
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an easing policy3. Then, the probability of “high vigilance” in a tightening “reference text”
(i.e., Probability(w:high vigilance,r:tightening)) will be 0.84 (=
10
10+2 ), and the probability of “high
vigilance” in an easing “reference text” (i.e., Probability(w:high vigilance,r:easing)) will be 0.16
(= 210+2 ). Using these probabilities, we calculate the wordscore of “high vigilance” as follows:
wordscore(w:high vigilance) = Probability(w:high vigilance,r:easing) × V alue(r:easing)
+Probability(w:high vigilance,r:tightening) × V alue(r:tightening)
= 0.16× (−1) + 0.83× (1) = 0.68
Therefore, if a “virgin text” contains the combination “high vigilance”, Wordscores assumes
that it contributes to 0.68 to the “virgin text’s” estimation policy. Point estimates on the
policy dimension are generated for “virgin texts”, computed as the mean of the scores of the
combinations, weighted by their relative frequencies within those texts.
Finally, it is crucial for the validity of this approach to select the appropriate “reference texts”.
They should provide enough information on the different policies dimensions for which one would
like to evaluate the ones of the “virgin texts”. We thus consider central banks’ statements
during the period 1999-2008 as “reference texts”, first because there has been enough variations
in terms of the number of policy changes, the direction of changes, and changes in the central
banks’ communication strategies and vocabulary as well, and second because most of the central
banks were confronted to the ZLB from that period4. These “reference texts” thus fulfill the
prerequisites suggested by Laver et al. (2003). Next, the aim is to estimate the policy position
of central banks’ statements (“virgin texts”) from 2009 until January 2014, and thus to reveal
the content of their forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis.
Wordscores requires the reference texts to be coded. Given that we are interested in the content
of central banks’ forward guidance, we rely on the central banks’ policy decision at time t+1 to
code central banks’ statement at time t. For instance, in December 2005, the ECB has increased
it’s main refinancing rate of 0.25 basis point, the statement of the ECB on November 2005 is
then coded +0.25. Therefore, we assess the direction of central bank’s policy rate at time t+1
following the words contained in its statement at time t. Then, Wordscores computes the policy
decision of the ECB in January 2009 by analyzing the words contained in the ECB’s statement
of December 2008.
2.2 Data
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank
(ECB), the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) adopted “Odyssean forward
guidance” on policy rates. Except for the BoE that has an explicit inflation target, and the BoJ
3denoted with a value of (-1)
4Except for the Bank of Japan that has adopted forward guidance in the context of its zero interest rate policy
in 1999.
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that has adopted an inflation targeting regime of 2% following government’s pressures at the
end of 2012, the ECB and the Fed have not adopted an explicit inflation target strategy for the
period under review. As such, they can be considered to have to manage their communication
policy more efficiently than targeting central banks whose communication can be more easily
focused (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2006; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). Moreover, in our view,
the BoJ is particularly interesting: first, because the creeping deflation has led it into the Zero-
Lower Bound region much before the two others and, second, because of its sudden strategic
change since December 2012- related to the “Abenomics” deflationary program endorsed by its
new chairman.
The method is implemented on this sample using statements that are considered to be a rele-
vant source of information for central bank watchers, hence, these latter may be different across
central banks. Then, one might argue that we compare “apples and pears” if we consider dif-
ferent communication tools, but it is worth nothing that for some central banks, the structure
of communication instruments such as press releases or post-meeting statements have evolved
through time due to changing communication strategies (e.g., for the BoJ), thereby rendering the
Wordscores analysis inaccurate if used (cf. Section 2.1). We then only consider communication
tools that have a consistent structure and are used in the same setting (Jansen and de Haan,
2010), whatever the economic environment throughout the analyzed period (1999-2014).
For the ECB, we consider the editorials of the Monthly Bulletin, as they contain an explana-
tion of why interest rates were changed or not, plus a summary statement of the Governing
Council’s view of the economy, hence, self-containing the information released by the President
introductory statements. For the FED, we rely on the Federal Open Market Committee post-
meeting statement, as it contains the Committee’s view about future economic development
and an outlook on the future federal funds target rate. For the Bank of England, we use the
Monetary Policy Committee minutes, which deliver an assessment of the economic conditions
in the national and international markets, and reflect the policy actions conditional upon future
developments of macroeconomic variables. For the Bank of Japan, we use the Monthly Report
of Recent Economic and Financial Developments, which contains a summary of economic and
financial developments, and form the basis of the decision on the guideline for money market
operations.
3 Results
Figures 1 to 4 below reveal the content of central banks forward guidance from 2009 until the
beginning of 2014, showing the results of the Wordscores estimates as well as the interest rates
implemented by the central banks under review, the main refinancing rate for the ECB, the
federal funds rate for the Fed, the BoE and the BoJ interest rates.
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Figure 1: ECB interest rate and cumulative Wordscores estimates
Figure 2: FED interest rate and cumulative Wordscores estimates
Figure 3: BoE interest rate and cumulative Wordscores estimates
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Figure 4: BoJ interest rate and cumulative Wordscores estimates
The results clearly show that all the central banks considered in this analysis (ECB, FED,
BoE, BoJ) had a communication policy, and thus, a forward guidance with an accommodative
stance from 2009 onwards. While the policy rates of these central banks was rarely moved
throughout this period due to the ZLB, the estimated values of the Wordscores methodology for
their respective statements are negative and had a decreasing trend until the beginning of 2013.
This confirms the fact that central banks use forward guidance as a policy instrument to provide a
temporal guidance of their accommodative monetary policies and their unconventional measures
when they are confronted to the ZLB. This obviously corresponds to the “Odyssean forward
guidance” described by Campbell et al. (2012).
Moreover, the change in the trend of the Wordscores values for the ECB, the Fed, the BoE and
the BoJ from the beginning of 2013 provides additional relevance to this observation. At that
time, Ben Bernanke, the previous FED chairman, stated that the U.S. Federal Reserve may be
done with its monetary stimulus the next year, this may explain the increase of the Wordscores
estimates for the Fed from that period. For the BoJ, this period also corresponds to the start of
the “Abenomics” economic policy and to the lunch of the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing,
which has not included an explicit forward guidance on the policy rate (Filardo and Hofmann,
2013). For the ECB and the BoE, this might be the future occurrence of an exit strategy that
explain the less accommodative stance of their forward guidance from 20135.
Overall, the estimates of the Wordscores approach give a clear overview of the accommodative
content of central banks’ forward guidance from 2009, and provide the prospects of the exit
strategy that most of the central banks start to consider through their statements. Although it
is important to remind that the Wordscores approach is more likely to complement rather than
to substitute itself to other predictive methods based on macroeconomic projections for instance,
it still gives important insights about the prospects of central banks’ moves of the policy rate.
5A member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), David Miles, on September 2012,
said the bank rate will be raised before the Bank of England (BoE) begins selling government bonds.
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Conclusion
Using the Wordscores methodology, this paper reveals the accommodative stance of central
banks’ forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis, and their exposure to the
ZLB. This approach also allow to unveil the exit strategy that central banks seems to consider in
their communication policy since the beginning of 2013, as the negative value of the Wordscores
estimates decreases from that time. The Wordscores methodology thus gives important insights
about the usefulness of central banks’ communication policy in time of economic troubles, and
provides a valuable tool to assess the consistency of communication policies, as well as it provides
a relatively easy-to-use forecasting tool.
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